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Summary findings
Kaufmann and Kaliberda challenge the conventional  Europe, the average is close to one-quarter. Intra-
view of how post-socialist economies function by  regional variations are great: in some countries 10 to 15
incorporating the unofficial economy into an analysis of  percent of economic activity is unofficial, and in some
the full economy. Then they advance a simple  more than half of it. The growth of unofficial activity in
framework for understanding the evolution of the  most post-socialist countries, and its mitigating effect on
unofficial economy, and the links between both  the decline in official output during the early stages of
economies, highlighting the main characteristics of  the transition,  have been marked.
"unofficialdom," contrasting conventional notions of  The initial empirical results seem to support
"informal" or "shadow" economies, and focusing on  hypothetical explanations of what determines the
what determines the decision to cross over from one  dynamics of the unofficial economy. Kaufmann and
segment of the economy to the other.  Kaliberda emphasize the speedy liberalization of markets,
The empirical evidence, based on both microsurveys  macro stability, and a stable and moderate tax regime.
and top-down  ("macro-electricity consumption")  Although widespread, most "unofficialdom" in the
comparative country methodology, suggests the  region is found to be relatively shallow - subject to
usefulness of the framework.  reversal by appropriate economic policies.
Integrating the unofficial economy into the analysis of  The framework and evidence presented have
the whole economy sheds a different light on  implications for measurement, forecasting, and
interpretations of national income, of sectoral trends  policymaking - calling for even faster liberalization and
(such as trade, services, and exports), and of labor  privatization than already advocated.  And the lessons ir
markets and household patterns, often leading to a  social protection and taxation  policy differ from
different interpretation.  conventional advice.
Over a third of economic activity in the former Soviet
countries was estimated to occur in the unofficial
economy by the mid-1990s; in Central and Eastern
This paper - a product of Country Department  IV, Europe and Central Asia - was presented as a draft at the Odes!;a
conference on "Economic Transition in the Newly Independent States," August 1995, and will be published in Economic
Transition in Russia  and the New States of Eurasia, edited by B. Kaminsky (M.E. Sharpe, 1996). Copies of this paper al e
available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Sylvia  Torres, room H.i-
169, telephone 202-473-9012,  fax 202-522-0010,  Internet address storres@worldbank.org.  December 1996. (43 pages)
The Policy Research Working  Paper Seoes disseminates the findings of  work in progress to  encourage  the exchange of ideas arout
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings  out quickly, even if the presentations are  less shan  fully polished. The
papers carny  the names of the autbors and should be cited accordingly.  The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed  in this
paperare entirely  those of the autbor. They  do not necessarily  represent  the view oftbe WorldBank, its Executive Directors,  or the  countries
they represent.
Produced  by the Policy  Research  Dissemination  CenterINTEGRATING THE UNOFFICIAL ECONOMY
INTO THE DYNAMICS OF POST-SOCIALIST ECONOMIES:
A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE
Daniel Kaufmann and Aleksander Kaliberda
*Daniel Kaufmann is currently  Visiting Scholar at the Harvard Institute for International Development,
on secondment from  the World Bank..  Aleksander Kaliberda is at the World Bank, Kyiv Office,  Ukraine.  The
views expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors (who take responsibility for all errors and omissions),
and do not necessarily reflect official institutional views. Comments are welcomed.  Internet:
Dkaufinan@hiid.harvard.edu  Akaliberda@worldbank.org  An earlier version of this paper  wasfirst presented
as a draft at the Odessa conference in August 1995, entitled 'Economic Transition in the Newly Independent
States '.  The present  version will be published in Economic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia.
edited by B. Kaminski (Armonk, NY: M.E.  Sharpe, Inc.,  1996).  It has benefitted from  the work of 1. Dobozi and
G. Pohl and from  comments and discussions with them and with J. Balkind, S.  Commander, E. Engel, A.  Gelb, S.
Johnson, B. Kaminsky,  V. Kuznetsov, L. Lovei, F. Le Gall, B. Milanovich, M. de Melo, A. Revenga, A. Sundakov
and U. Zachau.  We are grateful to the country economists in the World Bank and to T. Helleniak of the FSU
Statistic  Unit  for provision of country data.Integrating the Unofficial Economy into the Dynamics of Post-Socialist
Economies:
A Framework of Analysis and Evidence
Introduction: Recognizing Unofficialdom
Policy makers, politicians, foreign advisors, and international institutions analyze and
make decisions based on statistics measuring official activity. The inherent difficulties in
measuring unofficial activities, compounded by the reluctance of many government agencies to
acknowledge their importance, has led to a neglect of the unofficial segment of the economy. In
the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern Europe, however, its importance is
increasingly evident. ' Yet it is barely mentioned in the many official reports about these
economies. 2 Often only footnotes about it are inserted, or, at best, a few separate paragraphs as
an afterthought.
More fundamentally, little systematic attempt is made to integrate the analysis and
quantification of the unofficial economy into an overall review of economic developments in a
country. This matters significantly when trying to arrive at an understanding of national incomes
and production as well as other macroeconomic variables. At a sectoral level, neglecting the
unofficial economy blurs our understanding of what is happening with commerce, services, and
exports, for instance. At the microlevel, it does not allow for an effective assessment of which
households can or cannot cope on their own during the transition.
The omission of a systematic treatment of the unofficial economy also impairs the
provision of effective advice and of policy implementation. For instance, a country with a large
share of its activities in the unofficial economy would benefit from nonconventional policies in
areas such as social protection and taxation.
In order to redress such bias we have carried out a number of studies of the unofficial
economy. The work we have performed until recently, Ukraine-based microsurveys, is contained
in other papers. 3 In other countries, particularly in some Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries, local researchers have also carried out a number of studies of the unofficial economy.
At one level, this paper is a contribution to the study of the unofficial economies in the
FSU/CEE region. Yet, by assessing the unofficial economies' evolution and importance, we also
go further. This paper challenges the conventional view of what is important in these economies
and what are their dynamics. The hypotheses put forth, as well as the empirical findings, have
wide-ranging ramifications for economic analysis and policy making in the region. The sheer
magnitude and variance in the unofficial economy estimates derived here point to the need for
furthering our country-specific understanding of the unofficial economies in the region. The lack
of recognition of these activities in most analyses implies that an implicit estimate of zero (or
close to it) for the unofficial economy is chosen by default when working with levels or shares
(or same growth rates when analyzing trends).2
First, we present a simple framework emphasizing the main characteristics and
determinants of the unofficial economy. We then briefly review some of the microsurvey
evidence, focusing on Ukraine. Next, we develop a simple, common empirical methodology to
derive comparative estimates of the evolution and size of the unofficial economies in sixteen
countries in the region (including Ukraine). The approach is based in part on estimates of
aggregate electric consumption. In this respect, we draw partly from the recent work of Dobozi
and Pohl, relying on electricity consumption as a reasonable proxy for overall gross domestic
product (GDP) in a country. 4 In addition, we rely on independent estimates available for
unofficial economies from earlier studies to construct a baseline (at the beginning of the
transition). We also go significantly further, by providing a methodological approach to
measuring the unofficial economy, which is based on differential assumptions of energy
elasticities across countries.
The "macroelectric" approach to estimating an unofficial economy and the various
possible biases and drawbacks of this methodology are discussed. The case of Ukraine is tested
empirically as a case study for the applicability of the overall approach. The results for all
countries in our FSU/CEE sample are analyzed in a separate section. Various scenarios with
different assumptions (and sensitivity analyses) are presented. After reviewing the unofficial
economy dynamics between 1989 and 1994, we analyze the relationship between the evolution
of the unofficial economy and how overall performance fared in the sixteen countries in the
region.
Our framework of analysis and the empirical results have multiple implications for
policy. We discuss these in some detail in the concluding section of the paper.
A Simple Framework of Analysis for the Unofficial Economy
Main Characteristics of the Unofficial Economy
From a meaningful economic standpoint, we define an unofficial activity as the
unrecorded value added by any deliberate misreporting or evasion by a firm or individual. As
such, it correlates with untaxed incomes and (unrecorded) capital flight. In contrast to
conventional notions of shadow or informal economies in many other countries, particularly in
Latin America and Asia, the unofficial economies in Ukraine and many other FSU/CEE
countries exhibit some distinguishing features.
1. Coexistence of State and Nonstate  Activities and Enterprises
The state sector is rather active in unofficial activities, state officials and enterprise
managers are often linked to nonstate activities and firms in order to operate more flexibly and
generate "private income" flows (from state assets). Further, nonstate activities operating3
unofficially  are not necessarily  fully  private.  Leaseholders,  collectives,  and other  nonprivate
entities  play an important  role as well. Complex  bridging  channels  between  government
agencies,  state enterprises,  and nonstate  unofficial  activities  exist, since state  assets are utilized to
generate  unofficial  private income  flows  for state officials,  state managers,  and their conduits.
The unofficial  (or extralegal)  transfer  of state  assets to individual  hands is an equally important
mechanism  bridging  state entities  with unofficial  activities.  Decapitalization  of state assets is
often a spontaneous  transfer  from the state  to individual  ownership.
2. Visibility  and Size
Unofficial  activities  are not necessarily  small,  nor are they  relatively  invisible.  Some
activities,  in fact, are rather large and visible.  But their operation  and physical  visibility  does not
guarantee  ease of recognition  of their unofficial  nature.  This is because  many unofficial  activities
take place  within large state  enterprises  where  part of the operation  is official  and part is
unofficial.  Both are equally  visible  except  for accounting  and bookkeeping  purposes. 5 Some  of
the unofficial  activities  involve  technologically  sophisticated  and large-scale  activities  that are in
sharp contrast  to the "sidewalk stand"  notions  of informal  sectors  in other  parts of the world.
3. Unofficial  in an Economic  Regulatory  Sense
This unofficial  economy  is mostly  nonviolent  and noncriminal  (in contrast  to drug
cartels,  for instance).  There  is a criminal  mafia,  as in many  other countries,  that is often described
as the "shadow  economy." But the noncriminal  unofficial  economy  appears  to be much larger in
most of the FSU and CEE  states.  Unofficial  activities  have mostly  opted  to become  "unofficial"
in order  to avoid the burden  of administrative  regulations  (licenses,  permits,  etc.) on their
economic  activities,  and high taxation  rates. Hence,  they are extralegal  in an economic  regulatory
sense.
4. Continuum  in the Official-Unofficial  Activity  Spectrum
In contrast  with informal  sectors  in Latin  America  and Asia, for instance,  a sharp
dichotomy  between  official  and unofficial  activities  is often  absent  in the FSU and CEE states.
Depending  on their incentives  structure,  the degree  of unofficialdom  within each activity  or
enterprise  can vary along a continuum--from  operating  fully in the official  economy  to being
completely  unofficial.  The vast majority  of activities  operate  in both economies.4
5.  Social Services and State Subsidies Are Accessible to Unofficial Activities
Contrary to Latin American notions of "informal," whereby the informal sector is
defined in terms of activities outside of the social security net, in the FSU and CEE states
virtually every activity and individual is within the state social safety net. This is due partly to
the legacy of socialism and partly to two features already described above: the coexistence of
state and nonstate activities and the continuum in the official-unofficial spectrum within one
activity. Hence, many unofficial activities are very adept at extracting resources from the state,
which is an important engine for their growth.
6.  The Unofficial Economy Is "Shallow"
Since unofficial activities operate in very close proximity to official activities (often
within a continuum in the same line of business), and since they respond to economic incentives
largely driven by government policies, the unofficial economy is mostly of a "shallow" nature.
Except for the entrenched, hard-core mafia, activities hover flexibly between officialdom and
unofficialdom, largely motivated by government-induced incentives.
The Entrepreneur's Decision Rule
In simple analytics, the decision and extent to which an economic agent will choose to
operate in the unofficial economy will be determined by the point at which the expected marginal
benefits of doing so equal the (risk-adjusted) expected marginal costs. 6 As a generalized
proposition for the FSU and CEE states, the following factors are hypothesized as playing an
important role in influencing an enterprise's costs (including penalties) and benefits of operating
unofficially, and thus its decision of whether, and to what extent, to operate unofficially.
1. The degree of political liberalization versus repression. In our framework this is
to be interpreted mainly in terms of the degree of bureaucratic autonomy and discretion in
applying regulations that officials may potentially enjoy in a nonrepressed regime (in an
economy in transition). Substantial bureaucratic discretion will lower the perceived (and actual)
penalty of operating in the unofficial economy.
2.  The extent of underdevelopment in the rule of law and related institutional
enforcement mechanisms in a market economy. Conversely, the costs of operating
unofficially increase in an economy in transition where there is institutional strength and
sophistication of market-based institutions, particularly regarding a country's legal framework, its
enforcement efficacy, and the degree of incorruptibility of the judiciary and civil service. These
institutions, if well developed, provide checks and balances on potential abuses resulting from a5
bureaucrat's discretionary actions and increase the penalty of operating unofficially on
entrepreneurs and individuals. At an extreme, in a country at war, where such institutional
enforcement may all but have disappeared, the incentives for unofficialdom are very large.
3.  The degree of administrative controls versus economic liberalization of the
official economy. Economic liberalization is broadly interpreted to encompass liberalization of
the foreign exchange, trade, and pricing regimes, as well as deregulation at the enterprise level.
Thus, the higher the degree of official administrative controls (licenses, price and exchange
controls, etc.), the higher the costs of operating officially and hence the greater incentive for
escaping the official grasp by joining the unofficial economy.
4.  The official tax burden. High tax rates, multiple taxation, and constantly shifting
tax regimes (even with retroactive applicability) provide a powerful impetus for escape to the
unofficial economy.
5.  The extent of macroeconomic instability. The higher the degree of
macroeconomic instability, the greater the incentive to engage in unofficial transactions. In
particular, macroeconomic instability induces flight to foreign currency, capital flight, and barter
transactions. Further, the doctoring of a firm's accounts becomes easier when prices are volatile
and changing rapidly.
6.  The type of activity. Some types of activities, such as trade and commerce, are
more prone to operate unofficially than some large state factories. The costs of crossing over
from official to unofficial activities are greater for some activities than others, and so is the
probability of getting caught and being penalized. 7
At an aggregate country level, inferences can be made of the expected size and
dynamics of the unofficial economy, by aggregating individual decision making. One would
expect that a country would have a particularly large unofficial economy where political
liberalization has taken place, the demand for services and trade is substantial, there is a weak
legal institutional framework, high and volatile tax rates exist, and there is a lack of economic
liberalization and macroeconomic stability. From this simple framework it could be predicted
that countries like Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and (to a somewhat lesser extent) Russia would have
experienced a very large increase in their unofficial economies, while in Poland, Estonia, and the
Czech Republic, for instance, the increase would be smaller. 8
When predicting the dynamics of the unofficial economy at an aggregate country level
another important factor is the baseline size of the unofficial economy. The reason for this is that
there is a natural upper limit to the viable share of unofficial activities. Past a certain point,
crossing over to the unofficial economy means not only that there are fewer activities left in the
official economy but that by self-selection such activities are less prone or able to cross over. 96
The Case of Ukraine: Summary of the Microevidence
The formalized analytics and microevidence on the unofficial economy in Ukraine is
treated in some detail elsewhere."'  We summarize some of the issues and survey-based data
here.
Administrative Controls Since Independence
Until the end of 1994, Ukraine had not had a sustained attempt at economic
liberalization. A brief and partial attempt took place in late 1992 and early 1993, but it was
quickly reversed. In fact, except for that brief liberalization period (when Leonid Kuchma was
prime minister and Viktor Pynzenyk was his vice premier for economic reform), the degree of
official state administrative controls over markets and economic activity did not differ
significantly from pre-independence days. State-imposed restrictions, interventions and
distortions in the foreign exchange, trade, and pricing regimes, were extreme over much of the
late- 1991 to 1994 period. An administrative control index, summarizing state interventions and
controls in various markets in Ukraine, was constructed to trace the dynamics of liberalization
during the period and is presented in summary fashion in Figure 1--depicting the evolution of
(antiliberalization) administrative controls in various markets and regimes from early 1992 to late
1995 (see Table 1). Breaking from the unreformed past, the new administration embarked in late
1994 on a more ambitious liberalization program than theretofore, but it is still too early for these
reforms to have had an impact on the behavior of economic agents. Thus, to understand the
dynamics of the official and unofficial economies in early 1995, economic policies since
independence through 1994 are critical.
Indeed, until late 1994 the pronounced administrative impediments in the trade,
exchange rate, and pricing regimes, in addition to the high tax rates and microregulatory
impediments (many at the local level), implied a very high cost of doing business officially in
Ukraine--prohibitively high, in fact, for many entrepreneurs and fledgling activities. Thus, many
either closed down or became increasingly unofficial. Doing business unofficially has been the
strategy for many to reduce the very high cost of operating officially, and, in many instances, of
merely surviving.
The Costs of Operating Unofficially
The evidence on the cost of operating unofficially for those who choose to do so
underscores just how costly it is to operate officially. To provide a partial picture of these costs,
it is telling to review the microevidence on the unofficial "fees" required to overcome official
administrative impediments. Table 2 summarizes the responses of seventy-five nonstate small
and medium-sized enterprises regarding some of the costs of getting around various
administrative regulations. Recent survey work (with a different sample) also provides insight to7
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Table  2
Unofficial Fee Structure to "Solve"
Official Administrative Impediments: Ukraine 1994
IAverage Fee  J%  who repotpyn
One Export License/permit  $ 217  96%
Export Contract Paper work/processing  $ 189  96%
Expedite Border Crossing  $ 194  90%
One Import License/Permit/Registration  $ 108  93%
Import Paper work/processing per consignment  $ 101  92%
Each visit/Clearance from fire/health inspector  $ 40  72%
One phone line  $ 550  95%
Expedite creation of new enterprise  $ 186  64%
Each quarterly tax inspector visit  $ 91  56%
Unofficial office lease in State Institution (monthly)  $ 305  88%
Access to preferential credit in Krbn  $ 200  86%
Access to preferential credit in US dollars  $ 250  78%
the total amounts required." In 1994, small enterprises were spending on average about $2,000 a
year (in a range from $800 to $3,500) in unofficial payments to get around licensing and permit
requirements; the average in Kyiv, for small to medium-sized enterprises (state and nonstate)
exceeded $12,000 a year. These figures comprised a significant percentage of costs.  Such fees
can be interpreted as a high implicit tax on the enterprise." 2 In addition, many firms pay
"external facilitators" who act as intermediaries in resolving administrative difficulties. Smaller
firms pay an average of about $500 a year, while medium-sized firms pay more than $1,300.
Further, small to medium-sized firms throughout the country pay on average about $1,200 in
"protection" fees, in order to avoid being hit by organized and unorganized crime (although there
is a high intercity and interfirm variance here).  139
The Main Bottlenecks to Operating Officially:
The Entrepreneur's Perspective
When questioned in the various surveys conducted, entrepreneurs prominently and
repeatedly mentioned as the main bottlenecks to operating officially the following: (1) the
myriad of regulations in the foreign exchange and trade regimes; (2) high inflation; and (3) the
high tax rates and volatile and often retroactive tax regulations. Interestingly, such highly
restrictive bottlenecks, in the eyes of entrepreneurs, contrasted sharply with the entrepreneur and
manager's relatively nonintrusive assessment of more conventional determinants, such as labor
regulations, the skill and motivation of the labor force, enterprise registration, and infrastructure
constraints. Not surprisingly, when questioned about the type of measures that would provide a
strong incentive to return to the official economy, of paramount importance was the removal of
administrative controls in the trade and foreign exchange regimes, as well as a stable and
moderate tax structure and macroeconomic stability (that is, low inflation)." 4
From these microsurveys, the empirical link between the lack of liberalization and
stabilization and the flight to the unofficial economy appears to be rather strong. In fact, in
response to the question of timing and extent to which entrepreneurs would be prepared to switch
toward operating officially, about 50 percent stated that they would come back from
unofficialdom within two years of implementation of far-reaching economic liberalization and
tax reform measures (30 percent would do so during the first year), and over 33 percent would
come back thereafter. Only about 15 percent indicated that there would be no coming back to the
official economy, some because they did not believe in the government's ability to carry out
sustained liberalization reforms, and some because they were doing just fine where they were and
intended to carry on regardless." 5 Clearly, however, the bulk of the unofficial economy appears to
be shallow and thus amenable to reversal by liberalizing economic policies.
The Extent of the Unofficial Economy in Ukraine:
The Microevidence
Given the background of the high cost of operating officially, it is not surprising to
find that unofficial activities have mushroomed in Ukraine. Our initial survey work in 1992 on
the fledgling nonstate enterprise sector suggested that the extent of unofficial activities was
already about 25 percent of the total. Subsequent surveys in 1993, 1994, and 1995, while not
perfectly comparable in terms of sample size and characteristics, indicate fairly stable estimates,
ranging between 47 percent and 59 percent, for the nonstate sector."6  A rather partial sampling
from the state sector suggests that the acknowledged extent of engagement in unofficial activities
is lower than what the nonstate sector is prepared to acknowledge in surveys. But even using
such limited estimates, the suggestion is that unofficial activities by the state sector grew very
significantly, and by 1994 they were likely to approach or exceed one-third of overall activity by
the state sector.10
The microeconomic evidence at the individual worker level is also consistent with the
firm-level evidence. Survey work performed in the summer of 1994 indicates that about 70
percent of an urban sampling of current or ex-state enterprise employees were engaged in
unofficial activities. The sample participants as a whole derived more than one-half of their total
income from these nonofficial activities; formal wage income represented less than one-half of
their total income. For those working at lower-than-average official wages, the share of unofficial
incomes was about two-thirds.'7
To complement the microevidence presented here, and to provide for a comparative
methodology for FSU and CEE countries, we turn now to a top-down approach to measuring the
dynamics of the unofficial economy.
The Macroelectric Approach to Measurement of the Unofficial Economy and Its
Application to Ukraine
In most of the FSU and CEE states, official GDP figures measure the official
economy. Almost by definition, and due to the slow (and very partial at best) adaptation of
statistical methodology to more market-based systems, the unofficial economy has been
minimally captured in official statistics. Official GDP figures can therefore be considered a good
approximation of the measurement of official activities. But contrary to the prevalent use by
analysts and decision makers, they cannot provide a reliable measure of overall economic
activity in an economy. For a valid measurement of overall economic activity, a different
indicator is needed.
Unitary Elasticity of Electricity Consumption:
Sensible Assumption?
To measure overall economic activity in an economy, electric-power consumption is
regarded as the single best physical indicator of economic activity. Overall economic activity and
electricity consumption have been empirically observed throughout the world to move in
lockstep--with an electricity/GDP elasticity usually close to one." 8
By having a proxy measurement for the overall economy and subtracting it from
estimates of official GDP, an estimate of unofficial GDP can be derived. Before proceeding
further, however, we need to address the question of likely biases in utilizing electricity
consumption as a proxy for overall GDP.
We need to consider the special features of economies in transition in order to
determine possible biases in utilizing electricity consumption as a proxy for overall GDP. From
simple arithmetic it follows that an upward bias in the overall economy growth estimate (proxied
by electricity consumption) will result in an upward bias in the unofficial economy growth11
estimate, and vice versa.
The main factors that could cause an upward bias in utilizing electricity consumption
as a proxy for overall GDP are the following: (1) higher overhead and fixed electricity use per
unit of output resulting from capacity underutilization during an economic downswing; (2) some
technological redress due to the lack of basic maintenance; and (3) substitution of electricity for
other energy sources (such as electrical versus gas heating)." 9
Conversely, the following factors would cause a downward (conservative) bias in
utilizing electricity consumption as a proxy for overall GDP: (1) improved efficiency in
electricity use, given the very low efficiency starting base and subsequent energy-saving reforms;
(2) an increase in electricity prices; (3) a shift in output mix away from electricity-intensive
industries (within existing enterprises and start-up businesses); and (4) increased underreporting
of electricity consumption.
On balance, the consumption-increasing effects of the upward-biasing factors may be
more than fully offset by the downward-biasing factors. This is equivalent to considering as
conservative the assumption of unitary elasticity of electricity consumption response to output
changes. Consequently, for our first FSU/CEE scenario, we will maintain an assumption of
unitary elasticity, consistent with international estimates; one that assumes that the above factors
roughly cancel each other out. Insofar as efficiency improvements and output mix changes have
been particularly great, our estimates of the growth of the unofficial economy err in a
conservative direction. 20
It is far from certain, however, that the assumption of unitary elasticity will hold across the board
for all countries in transition. Hence, a second, more conservative, elasticity scenario is also to be
used in our approach. Some countries may have become even more energy-inefficient during the
transition, and others may have become more energy-efficient. Differences in energy efficiency
across countries in the region are mainly the result of differences in the adjustment path in energy
prices. The available evidence suggests that the price elasticity of electricity consumption is low,
particularly in the short term. Unlike other energy sources, electric power pervades all aspects of
modem economic activity, and substitution is difficult in the short term (unless there is
significant excess generating capacity, such as in Kyrgyzstan). Generally, estimates for the price
elasticity of electricity consumption are in the 0.05 to 0.15 range. But while the price elasticity
may be low, the efficiency implications of large price adjustments can still be significant.
Drawing on the work of D. Gray, C. Freund, and C. Wallich, 21 as well as discussions
with Dobozi and Pohl and the team preparing the World Bank Development Report 1996 on
Transition, a simple three-tiered classification of output elasticity of electricity consumption is
put forward: (1) the "energy-efficient" economies, which comprise the CEE countries where
energy price adjustments have been more significant and started earlier--assumed output
elasticity of electricity consumption of 0.9 (in the upswing); (2) the "energy neutral" economies,
comprising the Baltics, where price adjustment has taken place but started later--assumed unitary12
elasticity of electricity consumption; and (3) the "energy inefficient" economies, comprising the
rest of the FSU states, with relatively little (and/or delayed) price adjustment (and with buildup
of arrears)--assumed output elasticity of electricity consumption of 1.15 (in the upswing). We
label this the conservative elasticity scenario, since it differentiates in such a way to assume
increased inefficiency consumption in the FSU (and hence it potentially underestimates the
growth of the unofficial economy).
The third scenario--overall conservative--is built on the assumptions that: (1) every
unit produced in the (non-Baltic) FSU countries became even more energy-inefficient (by 5
percent) during the transition; (2) the Baltic states remained efficiency-constant in their electric
energy use; and (3) the CEE states became 5 percent more efficient in their use of electricity.
Hence, this scenario also differentiates according to broad energy-efficiency categories, yet it
focuses on overall efficiency ratios (rather than on elasticity differences, which imply differences
at the margin).
In summary, three scenarios are to be used empirically to derive estimates of change in
overall GDP, as a sort of sensitivity analysis: (1) the unitary elasticity scenario; (2) the
conservative elasticity scenario; and (3) the overall conservative scenario.
Official GDP Measures: Just That?
Since unofficial economy estimates are derived from the difference between overall
and official GDP estimates, it is also relevant to note possible measurement biases of official
GDP estimates. For our purposes, it is useful that official GDP estimates attempt to measure
official GDP, and little else. A possible bias is that the official GDP may not capture some new
products produced by official activities, which would result in an overestimate of the unofficial
economy emanating from our approach. Conversely, however, official GDP figures do capture,
at least minimally, some unofficial activities. Statistical offices, such as Goskomstat, include
some minimal adjustments in order to capture at least some unofficial activities. Neither factor is
likely to be very large nor subject to major yearly changes in the early 1990s. 22 Since on balance
there is no prior data as to which bias would prevail, no further adjustment is made in utilizing
the official GDP as the proxy for the official economy.
An Empirical Application of the Macroelectric Methodology:
The Case of Ukraine
On the basis of the subtraction of the two variables measuring overall and official
GDP growth, respectively, we can arrive at an estimate of the changes in the unofficial economy.
We collected data on both official GDP figures and electricity power consumption from 1989 to
1994 for each country from the World Bank and its FSU Statistical Unit. In addition, we
conducted research to establish a baseline (for 1989) empirical estimate for the unofficial13
economy for FSU countries and a circa 1989 baseline for each CEE country in the sample. On
the basis of the Berkeley-Duke research project on the USSR Second Economy conducted during
the late 1980s, as well as the work of J. Braithwaite, estimates ranging roughly between 10 and
15 percent of total economic activity were arrived at. 23 Thus, for purposes of our calculations
below, we use the 1989 midpoint estimate share of unofficial activities of 12 percent.
The next step is to calculate the figures for the overall GDP proxy, based on overall
electricity consumption. We also compute the indices for the official GDP. First, we perform the
computations for the unitary elasticity scenario.
Table 3: Ukraine
Electricity Consumption (as proxy of Overall GDP)
and Official GDP--1989-94
1982  1990  1921  1922  1993  1994
Growth rate in  0.0%  -2.2%  -6.2%  -7.8%  -11.7%
Electricity Consumption
Estimated growth rate  0.0%  -2.2%  -6.2%  -7.8%  -11.7%
in overall GDP (unitary
elasticity assumption)
Overall GDP Index  100.0  100.0  97.8  91.7  84.6  74.7
(1989=100)
Official GDP Index  88.0  84.5  73.2  60.4  51.4  38.8
(Index 1989=88)
The figures in Table 3 are our proxy variables for the calculations on the overall and
official GDP, respectively. They incorporate the baseline 1989 estimate for the unofficial
economy of 12 percent (hence, the official GDP index starts at 88.0 in 1989).
Next, we calculate the evolution of the unofficial economy during the period shown in
Table 4, which is presented in index numbers, starting at 12.0 in 1989 (since the base index is
100.0 for the overall economy). 2414
Table 4: Ukraine
Evolution of the Official and Unofficial Economy (unitary elasticity scenario)
1989  199Q  1291  192  199  1994
Official Economy Index  88.0  84.7  73.3  60.5  51.5  38.9
Unofficial Economy Index  12.Q  16.3  25.5  32.2  34.0Q  M
Overall Economy Index  100.0  100.0  98.8  92.7  85.4  75.4
On the basis of the index numbers in Table 3, which show the extent of the decline of the
economy in Ukraine, it is also easy to calculate the relative shares of the official and unofficial
economies, as shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Ukraine
Relative Shares of Official and Unofficial GDP (unitary elasticity scenario)
12M2  199  1991  1992  1993  1994
Official Economy Share  88.0  83.8  74.2  65.3  60.3  51.5
Unofficial Economy Share  12.0  16.2  25.8  347  397  48.5
Overall Economy Share  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Following the same approach for the other two more conservative scenarios, we can
calculate the unofficial economy index and shares, respectively, and present all three scenarios
together in Tables 6 and 7.  The data of Table 7 is depicted graphically in Figure 2.
Table 6: Ukraing
Unofficial Economy Index: three scenarios.
Unofficial Economy Index
1989  1299  1991  1292  1993  1994
Unitary Elasticity Scenario  12.0  16.3  25.5  32.2  34.0  36.6
Conservative Elasticity Scenario  12.0  16.5  25.2  30.9  31.5  32.7
Overall Conservative Scenario  12.0  14.8  22.5  28.0  28.8  30.9Conservative  Elasticity Scenario
Figure.
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Table 7: Ukraine
Unofficial Economy Share: three scenarios.
Unofficial Economy Shar
1989  1299  1991  1992  1993  1994
Unitary Elasticity Scenario  12.0  16.2  25.8  34.7  39.7  48.5
Conservative Elasticity Scenario  12.0  16.3  25.6  33.8  38.0  45.7
Overall Conservative Scenario  12.0  14.9  23.5  31.6  35.9  44.3
All three scenarios point to similar trends, orders of magnitude, and observations on the
evolution of the unofficial economy in Ukraine. In particular:
1. The unofficial economy in Ukraine has virtually tripled in size, while the official
economy is less than one-half the size it was in 1989.
2. The decline in the overall economy since 1989 has been by almost 30 percent. While
significant, this is still less than the decline derived from official statistics. Clearly, the decline in
the official economy in Ukraine has been mitigated by the rapid growth in the unofficial
economy during the period.
3. By 1994 the estimated unofficial share in the overall Ukraine economy exceeded 40
percent of the overall economy. These figures are roughly consistent with the microsurvey
estimates reported in the previous section.
4. Varying the initial 1989 baseline estimate for the unofficial economy by using lower
(say, 8 percent of overall activity) or higher (for instance, 16 percent) figures would only change
the estimated share of the unofficial economy by 1994 minimally--since the lion's share of
unofficial economy growth took place after 1990.
While far from providing definitive validation to the macroelectric approach, both the
sensitivity analysis and the empirical consistency between the macroelectrical and the
microsurvey approaches suggest that--with the appropriate caveats--it is worth expanding this
methodology to other countries in the region. We turn to such comparative assessment.
Expanding the Macroelectric Methodology: Application to FSU and CEE States
The number of countries included in the FSU and CEE sample totals sixteen, comprising
eleven from the FSU (Ukraine included) and five in CEE. Excluded are those countries for which
data was partially unavailable, and/or regarded by the country desk as particularly unreliable (e.g.17
Armenia), or where excess electricity capacity and hence substitution toward electricity is known
to have taken place (Kyrgyzstan). For all FSU countries the same baseline estimate share of the
unofficial economy of 12 percent was utilized; for CEE countries we relied on country-specific
microestimates available from independent sources. 25
Main Results
1. The Significant  Size of the Unofficial Economy in 1994 in Most of the Region
The 1994 share of the unofficial economy for all sixteen countries for the three
electricity-efficiency scenarios is presented in Figure 3. The differences among the three
scenarios for each country, while present, are not great when compared with intercountry
variance. On average, the unofficial economy share for CEE is about 21 to 24 percent (depending
on the scenario), while for the FSU the average is 36 to 39 percent, of overall GDP.
2.  The Relative Growth  in the Unofficial Economy
Taking the conservative elasticity scenario as our main case, changes in the unofficial
economy share for all sixteen countries are summarized in Figure 4, which depicts the respective
shares of the unofficial economy in 1989 and in 1994. Large overall growth in the importance of
the unofficial economy during the period throughout the region is clearly shown. The overall
share for the combined unweighted sample has more than doubled, from about 15 percent to
almost 33 percent of overall GDP.  The unofficial economy in the region also grew significantly
during the period (by over 50 percent) in absolute terms.
3.  High Variance in the Evolution of the Unofficial Economy
The high variance in the evolution and end-shares of the unofficial economy is as striking
as the overall increase over the period. The patterns vary significantly between CEE and FSU
countries, as well as within each regional group. As Figure 4 shows, in the late 1980s CEE
countries appeared to have had a substantially larger share of activities in the unofficial economy
than did the FSU (approximately 21 percent versus 12 percent). Yet the early 1  990s saw a very
sharp increase in unofficial activities in the FSU (with its share tripling to 36 percent), while the
overall share in the CEE sample rose only slightly. Within the FSU the 1994 estimates for the
unofficial share vary from merely 10 percent in Uzbekistan to over 50 percent in Azerbaijan and
Georgia (and 46 percent in Ukraine). Within the five CEE sample countries the estimates range
from 14 percent for the Czech Republic to 28 percent in Bulgaria.
4.  The Unofficial Economy as a Mitigator  in the Drop in Official GDP
Countries that experienced a particularly large decline in official GDP were able to
mitigate such a drop through rapid growth in the unofficial economy. The result was a
significantly lower decline in overall GDP than in official output in general; the mitigating effectFigure  3
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was particularly marked in countries with large declines in official  GDP.
The relationship between changes in official  and overall GDP for all sixteen countries is
depicted in Figure 5. Further, all eighty data points from the pooled sample are fit through a
regression line in Figure 6. It is clear from the primary data and from the OLS regression that as
the decline in official  GDP became very sizable, only slightly  over half of the official GDP drop
was translated into a decline in the overall economy. The other half of the official  GDP decline
was absorbed by the growing unofficial sector.
The relationship between the decline of the official  economy and the growth in the share
of the unofficial economy is depicted in Figures 7 and 8. A linear fit of the data (via OLS
regression) suggests that for every 10 percent cumulative decline in official  GDP, the share of the
unofficial economy in the overall economy grew by almost four percentage points.
Are Country-Specific Results Broadly Consistent with Hypothesized Priors?
The multiplicity  of factors that were hypothesized to be important in the evolution of the
unofficial economy are not subject to a rigorous test of significance  of the model's determinants in
this paper (that will be the subject of future research). However, the preliminary empirical results
appear to be broadly consistent with the suggested determinants of the unofficial economy
dynamics.
At one end of the spectrum, except for not being at war, Ukraine combines elements
conducive to maximum  growth in the share of the unofficial  economy through 1994: low initial
unofficial  economy share; low initial role of commerce and services in the economy; high degree
of political liberalization;  lack of economic liberalization and of macrostability; and undeveloped
market institutions. In fact, Ukraine is found to have the highest unofficial economy share among
the fourteen CEE and FSU sample countries not at war. Moldova and Russia, with somewhat
better performance regarding economic liberalization and stabilization but otherwise similar in
other respects, exhibit unofficial  economy shares of 40 percent, not far behind Ukraine. Not
surprisingly, however, the largest unofficial  economy shares (exceeding 50 percent) are found in
Georgia and Azerbaijan, countries at war.
At the other empirical end of the spectrum we find Uzbekistan, Romania, the Czech
Republic, and Poland, with shares of 10 to  18 percent. For different reasons, there seems to be a
convergence in the relatively low unofficial  economy shares in Uzbekistan and Romania, on the
one hand, and Poland and the Czech Republic, on the other. Romania and (particularly)
Uzbekistan have not had much economic liberalization, and both have exhibited even less political
liberalization, maintaining  tough enforcement mechanisms. By sharp contrast, the Czech Republic
and Poland have had a high degree of political liberalization  from 1990 onward, and they have
liberalized  their econornies very rapidly, stabilized their macroeconomies, and developed market
institutions and enforcement mechanisms  faster than other countries in the region. 26 Plausibly as
well, the Baltics fall into an intermediate category.21
While a comparison of the current share of the unofficial economy suggests a similarity
between Uzbekistan and some CEE countries, this convergence is not present when reviewing
over-time trends in the unofficial economy throughout the transition. One characteristic of the
evolution of the unofficial economies in the CEE countries is that the share of the unofficial
economy increased initially and then underwent a reversal. The year of the turnaround varies
among countries (e.g., after 1991 in Poland versus after 1993 in Romania). Overall there seems
to be an association between economic liberalization in CEE countries and a tapering off in the
growth, and subsequent decline, of the unofficial economy share.
Implications
Summary of Main Findings
This paper is a first attempt at providing a comparative perspective on the unofficial
economy in the FSU and CEE region. Yet by assessing its evolution and size we also go further:
we challenge the conventional view of what is important in these economies and what are their
dynamics. A simple analytical framework is presented in which we emphasize the main
characteristics of unofficial activities in the region to be the following (in contrast with
conventional notions of informal sector studies in other parts of the world): (1) coexistence of
state and nonstate activities and enterprises, where public institutions and state enterprises play
an integral role; (2) relative scale and visibility (often similar to official activities); (3) the
importance of the economic-regulatory nexus in motivating unofficial activities; (4) a continuum
in the official-unofficial activity spectrum (often within the same enterprise); (5) access to state
subsidies and social security; and (6) shallowness.
The main methodology used for comparing empirically the evolution of the unofficial
economy in the countries in the region is based on the measurement of the difference between
electricity consumption growth (as a proxy for overall GDP growth), on the one hand, and
official GDP growth, on the other. Taking the empirical case of Ukraine first, we reviewed the
available microevidence and surveys on the unofficial economy and then independently applied
the macroelectric methodology to the country. The results suggested broad consistency between
the micro- and macroelectrical approaches. We then applied the macroelectric methodology to
other countries in the region in order to establish a comparative perspective. The main empirical
results from this comparative methodology were: (1) significant size and growth in the unofficial
economy, whose average share in overall GDP more than doubled from 15 percent to over 30
percent for the sixteen countries in the region during 1989-94, and whose absolute growth
exceeded 50 percent; (2) large variance in the evolution and size of the unofficial economy
within the region; (3) unofficial economy partial mitigation of the large drop in official GDP; and
(4) broad cross-country empirical consistency with the hypothesized determinants for a rapidly
growing unofficial economy (that is, low initial share; high degree of bureaucratic discretion;
civil war; undeveloped market institutions and enforcement mechanisms; low degree ofFigure 5
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economic liberalization; high tax burden; and macroeconomic instability). Consequently,
countries like Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine exhibited very large unofficial economies by the
1990s, having experienced very rapid growth since the late 1  980s.
Nature of the Data and Implications for Measurement
By definition, any measurement of the unofficial economy is subject to substantial
margins of error. Further, errors stemming from the methodological assumptions made in our
approach ought not be ruled out. Hence, it is important to not leave the reader with any false
sense of precision concerning the numbers. Instead of accurate point estimates of unofficial
economy, figures should be regarded as orders of magnitude, and each estimated share should be
viewed as falling within a range. It should be noted that we have tried to maintain a conservative
approach to the estimates. And that support for the methodology and empirical estimates is found
from independent microsurvey data. Further, sensitivity analysis regarding reasonable ranges for
the assumed initial unofficial economy share and for the elasticity of electricity consumption
suggests that the margins of error are unlikely to be large enough to question the overall orders of
magnitude and broad trends reported here.
The sheer orders of magnitude and variance in these unofficial economy estimates point
to the need for furthering a country-specific understanding of the unofficial economies in the
region. The lack of official recognition of these activities in most analyses implies that an
implicit estimate of zero (or close to it) for the unofficial economy was chosen by default (or
when analyzing trends, the "default" assumption is that the growth rates of the official and
unofficial economies have moved in tandem--which is a fallacy in the FSU and CEE region).
Hence, however imperfect the unofficial economy estimates may be initially, attempts at
measuring and understanding the unofficial economy are bound to significantly improve
measurement and understanding of the dynamics of the overall economy.
Implications  for  Policy
Incorporating more fully the evolution of the unofficial economy into our understanding
of the dynamics of the overall economy leads to some differences in approach to policy design
and implementation. The details of optimal policy making would be expected to vary
substantially in a setting where the unofficial economy is either ignored or rather small (or where
it remains constant over time). We review these policy implications below.
1. Unofficial Economy:  Curse  or Blessing in Disguise?
The first question that needs to be addressed by the policy maker is what the official
approach toward the unofficial economy should be. Should it be one of further encouraging
growth, one of benign neglect, or one of active discouragement?27
From a national welfare standpoint, the unofficial economy has had a positive side,
particularly during the transition period. It has helped keep economies afloat, since the costs of
efficient production in the official economy have often increased. It has also debunked the myths
of lack of entrepreneurship and lack of readiness for the market by FSU citizens. Furthermore, it
has provided valuable market experience to such budding entrepreneurs.
However, the emergence and growth of a large unofficial economy also poses serious
concerns, which on balance dominate. First, the effective management of the economy by the
state is undermined. The integrity of the tax system and of the foreign exchange base that any
state needs to manage its economy is eroded by the rapid flight from the official to the unofficial
economy. Macroeconomic stability is thus harder to attain and sustain. Further, the legitimacy of
the overall legal and regulatory system is challenged by bankers, entrepreneurs, and households.
This can take years to reverse.
Second, however large, the unofficial economy is mostly a survival economy, where
trading, services, stripping of state assets (and/or of their income flows), and focus on short-term
turnover dominate the longer-term view. Large-scale and sophisticated investments, which are
crucial to the longer-term growth prospects of the country, are virtually absent. And third, when
compared with an officially liberalized official economy, the functioning of the unofficial
economy is associated with significant efficiency losses. This is because of the nonproductive
payments and time wasted by the briber and the bribed in getting around licenses and taxes, as
well as the decapitalization of assets.
Since the negatives prevail when assessing the pros and cons of the unofficial economy,
governments ought to design sensible strategies that do not stem the growth of the official
economy, and instead attract unofficial activities back to the official economy. An official
economy that increasingly incorporates unofficial activities could improve macroeconomic
management (through an improved tax base and official exports) and increase investment and
productivity.
2.  Official Market Liberalization and Deregulation as a Main Pillar in Attracting the
Unofficial Economy
Mustering the usual arguments about allocative efficiency, technological advance, and
competitiveness, conventional approaches to reforming economies emphasize the importance of
openness and market liberalization. In countries with a sizable unofficial economy, the rationale
for market liberalization is further strengthened and expanded. Liberalization of official markets
reduces the costs of undertaking official business, hence providing a strong incentive for business
to operate officially.
In fact, the argument favoring radical (versus gradual and/or partial) economic
liberalization is even stronger in settings with a large unofficial economy. This is because almost
every activity faces the choice of operating officially or unofficially. The choice is made on the
basis of cost-benefit considerations. An activity will not operate officially unless its net costs are28
lower than those of operating unofficially. Hence, the official liberalization effort has to be
sufficiently bold (and credible) so as to lower expected official costs of doing business to a level
below those of operating unofficially. Small liberalizing steps will affect only the marginal
unofficial activity and, in addition, will generally undermine the credibility of the reformns  in the
eyes of economic agents. Consequently, partial or gradual liberalization is not an effective
policy-making approach, particularly where there is a large unofficial economy. 27
The most visible (and aggregate) economic liberalization measures, such as removal of
price ceilings and export quotas, while necessary, are insufficient in themselves to sufficiently
lower the cost of operating unofficially. Deregulation, at both the micro and regional levels, is
also required in order to address issues of harassment and the costs of discretionary enforcement
of old regulations and laws (licenses, health and fire inspections, etc.). Thus, the concept of full
economic liberalization should include deregulation as an integral component.
3.  Macroeconomic Stability
The Ukrainian entrepreneurs' survey responses point to macroeconomic stability (and
very low inflation) as one priority in ensuring that they operate more effectively, and officially.
Lax budgetary and monetary policies, and the resulting high inflation, raise the expected benefits
of unofficial activities and reduce their perceived risks and costs. Furthermore, they increase the
costs of operating officially. Budgetary and credit handouts breed vested interests, which further
fuel and perpetuate unofficial income flows, domestically and abroad. For instance, it appears
evident that in Russia the episodes of large expansion of credit in 1992-93, which were
channeled by the central bank into many large state enterprises, were also associated with a very
significant (multibillion dollar) capital flight abroad.
Lax monetary policies and high inflation cloud financial accounting, making it easier to
distort official reports. At the same time, they reduce the probability of getting caught (or of
proving illegal behavior). Since domestic currency is increasingly perceived as a poor store of
value and an inadequate means of financial transaction, there is strong inducement to operate in
foreign currency. This is most often associated with unofficial activity, and with capital flight.
More generally, lax government finances are increasingly perceived by the public as a sign of
decay in the social fabric and as evidence of the state's inability to manage the official economy.
This further provides a self-justification for unofficial activity behavior.
The arguments favoring rapid attainment of macroeconomic stability are therefore
strengthened additionally when considering the behavior of economic agents in countries with
official and unofficial economies. A sufficiently large drop in the relative costs and  increase in
the expected benefits of operating officially are required for the crossover process to be reversed.
Hence, macroeconomic stabilization measures may need to be particularly bold, credible, and
sustainable.29
We should keep in mind, too, that macroeconomic stabilization is a key part of the overall
economic virtuous cycle. A program of radical macroeconomic stabilization is not only an
important input in reclaiming the unofficial economy; attracting the unofficial economy back to
officialdom is in itself an input to macroeconomic stability.
4.  Taxation:  Reinterpreting  and  Redesigning
In an economy with a large unofficial share, the issues of taxation may need to be
addressed differently. Reliance on tax to GDP ratios is widespread when assessing the tax burden
in an economy. However, without exception, the key measurement used is official GDP
estimates. As a result, tax to GDP ratios often appear to be rather high. And this frequently
results in commendations for affective tax collection from some quarters (macrofundamentalists)
and, conversely, criticisms for the excessively large and confiscatory role of the state from others
("PSD" [private sector development] and laissez-faire supporters). Where the role of the
unofficial economy is large, both sides may be missing the point. This is because in reality the
overall tax burden in the economy may not be large, and, furthermore, one important segment of
the economy may have completely "liberalized itself."
Let us consider the case of Ukraine. Official documents indicate that tax ratios in GDP
increased from 34.2 percent in 1991 to 38.6 percent in 1994. However, if we incorporate our
estimates of the unofficial economy into a measure of overall GDP instead, the recalculated tax
in GDP ratios would indicate a decline from 25.4 percent in 1991 to 21.0 percent in 1994.28 In
other words, contrary to calculations from official statistics, the overall (explicit) tax burden in
Ukraine is not very high. Instead, it has a skewed distribution: it is extremely high on official
activities not enjoying tax exemptions and nonexistent on unofficial activities. From the early
1990s onward, because of the increasing burden on official activities, many crossed to the
unofficial economy, and a vicious cycle ensued, as higher taxes were then imposed to try to
compensate for lower revenues. This in turn further eroded the taxable base as more activities
became unofficial. This is one example of an interpretation (akin to an adverse selection model)
that is made possible when integrating the unofficial economy into the study of the overall
economy.
The importance of this approach for policy advice thus becomes self-evident. In many
countries, instead of attempting to generate further taxes via higher tax rates, the potential of
increasing the tax base should be exploited much further--especially when the role of the
unofficial economy is relatively significant. Due to the relative ease with which economic agents
can cross over to the unofficial economy, a number of countries in the region appear, in fact, to
fall into the negative sloping segment of the Laffer curve--that is, higher tax rates may well be
resulting in lower tax revenues. Conversely, more moderate and stable taxes may result in a
significant increase in the tax base. 29
There are fixed costs in crossing over from operating unofficially to operating officially.
In addition to lowering the costs of operating in the official economy (through a lower tax burden
and elimination of administrative impediments), it is also important to provide incentives30
lowering the fixed costs of crossing over. A substantial perceived fixed cost by unofficial
activities contemplating crossover is that of being taxed or otherwise penalized for past
underpayments when exposing themselves to the official economy. To reduce such fixed costs,
policy makers may consider an amnesty for past taxes and related fees up to a certain date tied to
the institution of the new policies. 30
Finally, in assessing the optimal tax rates themselves, due consideration needs to be given
to the size and dynamics of the unofficial economy. The unofficial economy is being implicitly
taxed, as we have reported--even if the revenues do not accrue to the budget. Particularly where
the unofficial economy is large, the official tax rates need to be designed in such a way that the
overall burden on enterprises is lowered below that of operating unofficially. As compared with
economies where the unofficial economy is small (and/or very costly), the optimal tax rates are
thus likely to be lower where the unofficial economy share is relatively large.
5.  Foreign  Exchange  Management:  Full Unification or Escape?
A sizable unofficial economy would encompass a large share of unofficial foreign
exchange transactions and holdings, both domestically and abroad. This in turn impairs
macroeconomic and balance-of-payment management. Attempts by a government to clamp down
on these activities through prohibition of foreign exchange transactions or imposition of high
surrender requirements (at less than the street-market rate) would only exacerbate the loss of
state control over foreign exchange management. This is because the perceived cost of doing
business officially increases by more than the cost of doing business unofficially when
governments impose such administrative sanctions. The official (implicit) tax rate on foreign
exchange transactions from a dual or multiple exchange rate drives the entrepreneur to choose
nonofficial channels. Full unification of the exchange rate therefore becomes the inescapable
policy implication in order to stem the flow to unofficial activities (and capital flight) and to
attract unofficial activities back to officialdom.
These benefits of unification of the exchange rate regime are not a mere theoretical
construct. Data from Ukraine's official auction for foreign exchange, already operating for almost
three years, provides compelling evidence. During periods when the official exchange rate was
less than 70 percent of the (street) market rate, the (nongovernment) foreign exchange supply to
the auction was about $50 million per quarter. Conversely, during times when the official rate
has exceeded 80 percent of the street rate, supply to the official auction has averaged about $550
million per quarter, as shown in Figure A3 in the Annex.  In other words, the annualized
difference in supply between a quasi-unified and nonunified exchange rate auction is about $2.2
billion.
6.  Privatization: On the Fallacy of Equity Versus Speed
From early on in the FSU transition there has been a debate as to the optimal speed,
scope, and type of privatization of the enterprise sector. Among other points debated, many have
argued for gradualism (and partiality) on the basis of equity and implementation efficiency, so as31
to have an optimal methodology and institutional mechanisms in place.
In the context of our framework of analysis, what this debate misses are the dynamics of
the unofficial economy. The longer the delay in official privatization, the more state assets de
facto cease to be in state hands--or at the very least, many cease to provide the state with income
flows. Decapitalization, asset stripping, and unofficial appropriation of income flows become
widespread as the fine-tuning of the optimal privatization methodology goes on. Yet a
spontaneous privatization of assets and increased "privatized" income flows benefit only a
relatively few. Thus, the distribution of wealth and income becomes particularly skewed while
awaiting implementation of an official mass privatization program.
Furthermore, the methodology of privatization that would have been optimal early on
becomes less effective as time passes, since the growing vested interests of powerful groups of
managers and other de facto owners of state assets increasingly resist a more participatory
distribution of assets. For instance, share allocation rules need to be increasingly skewed in order
to bribe interest groups into official privatization. Resistance from some local authorities also
mounts, as the fruits of unofficialdom become institutionalized.
Hence, particularly when viewed from an overall economy framework (including the
unofficial segment), speed in the official privatization program, for small and large enterprises,
ought to be paramount. Neither equity nor sophisticated methodological and institutional
considerations provide strong arguments for a slower or more partial privatization path in the
FSU and CEE states.
7.  Social Protection and Labor Market Dypamics: Who Is Not Coping and How Best to
Target Them?
In settings with a large unofficial economy, conventional notions of formal wage incomes
and employment being reliable indicators of an ability to cope do not hold. For instance, where
official wages represent only about one-half or less of total income, as in Ukraine, one finds a
sizable group of officially employed workers barely eking out a subsistence living, while many
individuals officially not working and not receiving unemployment assistance are coping
adequately. Conventional Western dichotomies between the formally employed and the
unemployed are less helpful in the FSU. Instead, there is an employment spectrum continuum
between full (and exclusive), formal employment, on one extreme, and wholly occupied in
unofficial activities, on the other. The officially unemployed, or the "hidden" (formally)
unemployed, are most often (at least) partially engaged in unofficial occupations. 3'
Empirical research in Ukraine suggests that a better (that is, other than formal income)
proxy for the ability of individuals or households to cope is access to human and physical assets
such as: (1) particular skills and educational attainment; (2) real estate property; (3) livestock; (4)
a car; (5) a rental apartment or garage space; (6) business trips abroad; and (7) more well-off
relatives. 32 For instance, many female-headed households, and generally households with
multiple dependents (particularly children), appear to lack such access and thus fall in the32
"noncoping" category--even though many of the women are formally employed. Access to
certain assets is highly correlated with total (official and unofficial) income; however, a formal
job is only highly correlated with formal wage (rather partial) income. Hence, recognizing the
flexible continuum in labor market dynamics that mirrors the official-unofficial enterprise
continuum leads to different policy advice.
Given the imperfection of conventional means-testing indicators, deepening our
understanding of the main attributes of noncopers is paramount to improving the targeting of
those in need--while keeping social outlays from the state consistent with macroeconomic
stability. Such improved understanding can only come by having a framework of analysis that
fully integrates unofficial activities into the very varied spectrum of income-generating
opportunities in the FSU and much of CEE.
8. Peering into the Future: Projection Models and Toward an Integrated Framework of
Analysis
Projection models for the path of official GDP would be expected to give different results
in a country with a sizable unofficial economy when compared with a country where virtually all
activities are official. This is because of the large universe of potential crossovers to the official
economy if the right policy mix is put in place. Hence, what conventionally may appear as
overambitious official projections for the expected supply response should not necessarily be
unrealistic in countries that liberalize their economies and reform their tax regimes. 33
Conversely, countries that delay or backtrack in their reforms may see larger declines in
GDP than assumed when the role of the unofficial economy is ignored. At the same time, in
nonreforming countries that have already experienced a rapid increase in the importance of the
unofficial economy, caution is needed when extrapolating from our results as a means of
projecting the continuing growth of the unofficial economy. This is largely because of the natural
upper limit in the number of activities that can become unofficial. Once the bulk of activities
have crossed, the remaining number of potential future crossovers dwindles. 34
We conclude by suggesting that both the framework of analysis and the evidence
presented in this paper, particularly in the case of the FSU states, point to the need for a fuller
and more rigorous integration of the unofficial economy into a comprehensive framework of
analysis. Such an integration should also be undertaken vis-a-vis both the heretofore
conventional economywide and forecasting models and with regard to policy advice. Regarding
policy advice, it is clear that stabilization, liberalization, and privatization need to be even bolder
than assumed.
More generally, further empirical work is needed on this subject. This paper is an initial
contribution to the topic, and while the advantages of having a common methodology are to be
emphasized, the precision of the estimates ought not to be exaggerated. Further research should
deal with this issue in more depth and test econometrically the determinants of growth in the
unofficial economy.33
In recognizing the existence of the unofficial economy it is evident that sometimes a
statesman is ahead of the analysts in providing a.vision of what is important. Ukraine's President
Leonid Kuchma, in his October 1994 address to parliament entitled "The Road of Economic
Reform," broke radically from the past shortly after coming to power, as he grasped the
implications of Ukraine's large unofficial economy: "... In Ukraine's economy today, the situation
has developed to the point where government's regulation weakens the government's real
influence on the economy. The balance between the legitimate and unofficial economies is
definitely tipped in favor of the latter. The conclusion is self-evident; retaining government
regulation has become ineffective. The only alternative is the acceleration of economic reform." 3534
Notes
1. Throughout this paper, CEE will denote Central and Eastern Europe and FSU--the states of
the former Soviet Union.
2. The Berkeley-Duke studies of the "second economy" during the Soviet era are an exception.
More recently, the qualitative importance of the unofficial economy in Russia is acknowledged
in James Leitzel's Russian Economic Reform (London: Routledge Press, 1995).
3. Daniel Kaufmann, "Diminishing Returns to Administrative Controls and the Emergence of
the Unofficial Economy," Economic Policy, 19, December 1994; idem, "Market Liberalization
by Stealth: Curse or Blessing in Disguise?" in Trade in the New Independent States,
Constantine Michalopoulos and David G. Tarr, eds., Washington, DC, World Bank/UNDP
(United Nations Development Programme), 1994; Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and Oleg
Ustenko, "Winners, Losers and Survival Strategies in Ukraine," mimeo, The World Bank and
Duke University, October 1995.
4.  Istvan Dobozi and Gerhard Pohl, "Real Output Decline in Transition Economies--Forget
GDP, Try Power Consumption Data," Transition Newsletter, World Bank, vol. 6, January-
February 1995.
5.  It is well known that many enterprises keep three sets of books: one for the enterprise's own
management, one for potentially interested investors, and one for tax officials.
6. A rigorous formalization of this conceptual framework will be presented in a forthcoming
paper.
7. This factor (type of activity) needs to be interpreted flexibly. In the FSU and CEE states
almost any type of activity can operate unofficially. The difference is one of probability and the
extent of doing so along a continuum.
8. Except for the fact that in the latter group there has been significant political liberalization.
The relative sophistication and efficacy of this group's market and legal institutions could be
expected, however, to neutralize potential bureaucratic discretion in applying regulations (and
negotiating "rules of the game" with entrepreneurs).
9.  Let us consider two countries suddenly facing a democratic transition to market, and hence a
reduced cost structure for carrying out unofficial activities but without a concomitant reduction
in the costs of doing official business. The country starting from a very low share of unofficial
activities would be expected to exhibit a larger increase in its unofficial economy than would the
country that starts from a much higher unofficial economy share, all things being equal.
10. See Kaufmann, "Diminishing Returns to Administrative Controls"; and Johnson, Kaufmann,
and Ustenko, "Winner, Losers and Survival Strategies".35
11. Ibid.
12. These fees provide a basic indication to what can be the higher--and at times prohibitively
so--cost of doing business officially. Nevertheless, enterprises still "chose" to pay high unofficial
fees rather than to stay in the official economy.
13. Some of these "protection" fees also need to be paid by firms operating officially.
14. See Kaufmann, et al., "The Evolution of Ukraine's Administrative Controls," forthcoming.
15. The unwillingness (or delay) to come back to the official economy can be conceptualized in
terms akin to a hysteresis effect, in which there is an option value of waiting, while uncertainty is
(partly) being resolved (e.g., further information about costs and benefits in each "state" is being
gathered, etc.). See Avinash K. Dixit and Robert S. Pindyk, Investment Under Uncertainty
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
16. Kaufmann, et al., "The Evolution of Ukraine's Administrative Controls," forthcoming.
17. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Ustenko, "Winners, Losers and Survival Strategies."
18. Dobozi and Pohl, "Real Output Decline in Transition Economies."
19. This discussion of the potentially biasing factors draws substantially from Dobozi and Pohl,
ibid.
20. Dobozi and Pohl, ibid., maintain the unitary elasticity assumption throughout their
calculations. A number of criticisms have been leveled against the unitary elasticity assumption
in their calculations; see Vincent Koen's and Lev Freinkman's letters to the editor in Transition
Newsletter.  We relax this assumption and provide a more differentiated classification in the
second and third scenarios presented.
21.  See Dale Gray, "Reforming the Energy Sector in Transition Economies: Selected Experience
and Lessons," World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 296, 1995; and Caroline L. Freund and
Christine Wallich, "Raising Household Energy Prices in Poland: Who Gains? Who Loses?"
World Bank, Working Paper No. 1495, 1995.
22. As of late 1995, Russian national accounts were undergoing a significant revision in order to
incorporate unofficial activities. This does not affect the official figures we utilized, which were
received up to mid-1995.
23. Valeriy M. Rutgaizer, Gregory Grossman, Vladimir G. Treml, et al., "Studies on the Soviet
Second Economy," various reports, 1986-91. Also, see various estimates in Janine Braithwaite,
"From Second Economy to Informal Sector: The Russian Labor Market in Transition," mimeo,
World Bank, 1994.36
24.  The first and third rows of Table 3 are taken from the calculations in Table 2, while the
second row (unofficial economy) is the difference between the third and first rows.
25.  Sources for information utilized:  Poland: Research Center for Economic Studies; Timothy
E. Heleniak, The World Bank.  Czech Republic: Timothy E. Heleniak, The World Bank.
Hungary: Janos Arvay and Andras Vertes, "Impact of the Hidden Economy on Growth Rates in
Hungary," International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, 23rd General
Conference, St. Andrew's, New Brunswick, Canada, 21-27 August 1994. Romania: Romanian
Society of Economists (SOREC).  Bulgaria: Timothy E. Heleniak, The World Bank.  FSU:
Berkeley-Duke Studies of the Second Economy; Janine Braithwaite, "From Second Economy to
Informal Sector: The Russian Labor Market in Transition," mimeo, World Bank, 1994.  Note
that for CEE countries the point estimates from available studies are from the early 1990s, thus
necessitating extrapolation backward and forward in our macroelectric framework.
26.  It ought to be noted, however, that although the Czech Republic's share of the unofficial
economy today, at 18 percent, is still low relative to other countries, the share grew significantly
during the period--it was extremely low initially, estimated at less than 5 percent.
27.  In reality, there is a paradox. It is precisely in those settings with large unofficial economies
that there often has been less inclination to liberalize in the first place. This in turn led to the
large size of the unofficial economy. Hence, a farsighted team of reformists is often needed, one
that is prepared to break from the past in light of the evidence and fully liberalize the official
economy.
28.  Figures calculated on the basis of data from: Ekonomika Ukrayiny v 1994 rotsu; Annual
Report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Statistics of Ukraine, March 1995;
Statvstychny Schovichnyk Ukrayiny a 1994 rik, Ministry of Statistics of Ukraine (Kiev:
Tekhnika, 1995); data of the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine.
29.  These general points on optimal tax rates would require further empirical elaboration; no
precise recommendations on tax rates or tax reform measures are intended here. More generally,
however, even the entrepreneurs' responses indicate their willingness to return to the official
economy if taxes were moderate and stable (and nonretroactive). But the return to the official
economy would be gradual, which would need to be factored into the detailed tax calculations.
30. A clear distinction would need to be made between leniency regarding the past and the strict
penalties expected from underreporting in the future. In fact, a clear signal from the time of the
announcement in the form of stronger enforcement of tough penalties for concurrent illegal
activities, would be warranted.
31.  See Johnson, Kaufmann, and Ustenko, "Winner, Losers and Survival Strategies," for a
formalized and empirical elaboration on these issues.
32.  Ibid.37
33.  At least in the medium term.
34.  Hence, in a country with given preconditions favoring crossover to the unofficial economy it
can be hypothesized that the rate of adoption of the unofficial economy over time is akin to an S-
shaped curve that tapers off at higher levels of adoption due to the dwindling residual universe
(as in the literature of adoption of technological innovation).  More generally, when forecasting it
is important to consider that inappropriate policies providing an incentive for crossover will also
bring down aggregate demand, slowing down all activities, unofficial and official alike. In other
words, there is a complex interplay between a country's economic reforms (or lack thereof) and
the substitution and income effects on the path and dynamics of the unofficial economy.
35.  A program of macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization, and privatization was launched in
Ukraine in late 1994, shortly after President Kuchma's speech to Parliament.38
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Note:  An index  of 100  signifies  complete  unification  (i.e. equivalency  in utilizing  official  or open market  channels  to redeem  dollars).
The Exchange  Rate  Unification  Index is calculated  according  to the  formula:
ERUI=[(NVBU  Rate/Market Rate)  Forex Surrender Share+(Auction rate/Market Rate) *(I-Forex  Surrender Share)1 *100.
For the period 1992  -Jan.Feb.  1993  when  40%  tax  was applied  (instead  of surrender  requirement)  the formula  applied  was
ERUI=(Auction  Rate/Market  Rate)*0.6.  Since  October  1994  Auction  rate is equal  to NBU  effective  surrender  rate.
Source: National Bank of Ukraine data, World Bank calculations.Table Al
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